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We thank Greg Crespi1 and Russell Korobkin2 for their provocative responses to our author-prominence ranking of specialized law
reviews.3 Crespi provides a thoughtful critique of the methodology
we employ and the results we obtained. Korobkin shares some of
Crespi’s concerns,4 but he focuses his critique on the potential implications of our rankings (and rankings more generally). In this reply,
we briefly address the more significant criticisms each of them
raises.
I. REPLY TO CRESPI
Crespi, himself a “ranker,”5 is sympathetic to our attempt to provide a ranking of specialized law reviews, but he rejects the method* Associate Professor of Law and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science,
University of Missouri. B.A., B.S., Southern Methodist University, 1989; J.D., Stanford Law
School, 1992.
** Associate Professor of Law and Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Dispute
Resolution, University of Missouri. B.A., Stanford University, 1989; Ed.M., Harvard University, 1991; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1994.
1. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Ranking Specialized Law Reviews: A Methodological
Critique, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 837 (1999).
2. See Russell Korobkin, Ranking Journals: Some Thoughts on Theory and Methodology, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 851 (1999).
3. See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, An Empirical Evaluation of Specialized
Law Reviews, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 813 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 2, at 861 (contending that “[n]umerous challenges
could be raised to the design of the author-prominence scale”).
5. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Ranking the Environmental Law, Natural Resources
Law, and Land Use Planning Journals: A Survey of Expert Opinion, 23 WM. & MARY
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ology we employ. Because he finds our methodology unpersuasive, he
is also skeptical of our results. While we acknowledge his concerns,
we believe they are exaggerated.
A. Methodology
We decided to rank specialized law reviews based on the prestige
of the authors publishing in those reviews.6 Crespi argues that the
“greatest shortcoming” of our ranking is our “failure to offer anything even remotely approaching an adequate explanation and justification for [our] methodology.”7 Specifically, Crespi argues that we
fail to justify: (1) our decision to rank based on a single factor, rather
than multiple factors; (2) our selection of journal prestige as that factor; and (3) our use of the Jarvis-Coleman author-prominence scale8
to measure journal prestige.
1. The Single-Factor Method
Crespi first argues that we “fail to offer a justification for [the]
use of a single-factor method of ranking journals, rather than a more
comprehensive approach that incorporates two or more indicia of
journal quality.”9 Given that Crespi himself has employed a singlefactor ranking methodology,10 we find his concerns about our use of a
similar approach somewhat surprising.
We acknowledge the potential value of a multiple-factor ranking
methodology, which, at least in theory, might produce a more “accurate” ranking of journals than a single-factor methodology.11 If, for
example, we had ranked specialized law reviews based on a combination of factors, such as author prominence, citation counts,12 usage,13
expert opinion,14 prestige of publishing school, and circulation, we
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 273 (1998) [hereinafter Crespi, Ranking Environmental Law];
Gregory Scott Crespi, Ranking International and Comparative Law Journals: A Survey of
Expert Opinion, 31 INT’L LAW. 869 (1997) [hereinafter Crespi, Ranking International Law].
6. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 826.
7. Crespi, supra note 1, at 843.
8. See Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis G. Coleman, Ranking Law Reviews: An Empirical
Analysis Based on Author Prominence, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 15 (1997).
9. Crespi, supra note 1, at 843.
10. See Crespi, Ranking Environmental Law, supra note 5 (ranking environmental
law/natural resources law/land use planning law reviews based on expert assessments of
their prestige); Crespi, Ranking International Law, supra note 5 (ranking international and
comparative law reviews based on expert assessments of their prestige).
11. Although we utilized a single-factor methodology, we considered a substantial data
set, coding an average of nearly 35 authors per journal. Thus, our single-factor study does
not suffer from a weakness common to such approaches, i.e., reliance upon a small number
of observations for each dependent variable.
12. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 824-25 n.59.
13. See id. at 825.
14. See id. at 826.
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might very well have produced a “better” ranking than we produced
using only one of those factors. In practice, however, it is not so clear
that multiple-factor methodologies produce “better” rankings. Consider, for example, the controversial “Bowl Championship Series” or
“BCS” ranking of college football teams this past season, which
prompted more widespread and virulent criticism than the prior single-factor method of ranking (i.e., polls).15 Closer to home, consider
the multiple-factor methodology that U.S. News & World Report uses
to rank law schools,16 which Crespi cites in his response.17 In 1998,
using its multiple-factor methodology, U.S. News ranked the University of Texas Law School twenty-ninth.18 If U.S. News, however, had
ranked law schools using the “academic prestige” factor alone, Texas
would have placed fourteenth,19 rather than twenty-ninth, which
seems more in keeping with Texas’s standing in the legal academy.
Like all prior journal “rankers,”20 we used a single-factor methodology in part because of the impracticalities associated with using a
multiple-factor methodology. Notwithstanding Crespi’s accurate assertion that our use of a single-factor methodology allowed us to
avoid “the substantial difficulties of developing an algorithm for
combining the scores assigned to two or more indicia of quality,”21 we
did in fact conduct a substantial amount of work to produce our single-factor ranking. We (with the much-needed help of four diligent
research assistants) collected and coded all article authors and their
15. See, e.g., Hal Bock, BCS: Bonanza or Bust? New Formula to Crown College Football’s National Champion Might Not Work After All, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 6,
1998, at D1 (noting that some college football teams believe that “the [bowl championship
series] system, with its complicated formula weighing polls, computer rankings, strength of
schedule and won-lost records, did not serve them fairly”); William Gildea, Ranking the
Teams Is Not as Easy as Pi, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1998, at D1 (“This year—here the rankings’ stew begins to thicken—college football officials decided to establish a new method for
deciding which teams would play in what would be billed as the Division I-A championship
game. Several components were selected to determine the Bowl Championship Series
rankings, among them, lo and behold, the Seattle Times rankings—the work of frat buddies
[Jeff] Anderson and [Chris] Hester.”); Mark Kiszla, Final Four Would Settle Debate at Last,
DENVER POST, Nov. 30, 1998, at C1 (noting that the BCS, which employs “a complex
mathematical formula understood only by NASA scientists,” does not work).
16. See, e.g., 1998 Annual Guide: Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 2, 1998, at 80 (describing the multiple-factor methodology used to rank law schools)
[hereinafter 1998 U.S. News Rankings].
17. See Crespi, supra note 1, at 843 n.16.
18. 1998 U.S. News Rankings, supra note 16, at 78 (reporting, in part, that Texas tied
for 29th with the law schools at Boston University, Brigham Young University, and the
University of California-Davis).
19. In 1998 U.S. News provided an “academic reputation” score on a 5.0 scale for each
law school it ranked. See id. at 80. Texas received an academic reputation score of 4.2,
which placed it 14th, tied with Georgetown. See id. at 78.
20. As far as we know, those scholars who have ranked legal periodicals have used
single-factor methodologies. See George & Guthrie supra note 3, at 824-26 (discussing various single-factor methodologies).
21. Crespi, supra note 1, at 843.
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occupations from 1354 volumes of 285 specialized reviews.22 In sum,
we coded approximately 10,000 pieces of information to produce our
modest article.23 It simply would have been too burdensome to develop and apply a multiple-factor ranking methodology to the universe of specialized law reviews when none of the single-factor data
had previously been collected and coded.
We hope that other scholars will attempt to rank specialized journals using other single-factor methodologies, like citation counts, usage surveys, and expert opinion. Through the use of multiple singlefactor rankings, we can collectively accomplish something akin to
convergent validity (assuming sufficient overlap in the rankings) or
determine that one or more of the single-factor methodologies (including, perhaps, the author-prominence methodology) are deficient.
We welcome, for example, Crespi’s comparison of the results of his
“expert opinion”24 rankings of international and environmental reviews to our more general ranking of specialized reviews.25
2. Journal Prestige
Not only does Crespi question our decision to rank using a single
factor, he questions the single factor we chose—prestige. While Crespi concedes that a “strong case can be made for focusing the ranking
methodology on prestige-related factors,”26 he contends that we “fail
to offer any arguments defending [our] choice of using prestige as
the primary evaluative criterion,”27 rather than other criteria we
could have used, such as timeliness, “editorial staff qualifications, or
the scope of distribution.”28 Crespi is particularly (and inexplicably)
troubled by our decision to “ignore altogether the relative merits of
the different law reviews as student instructional vehicles, even
though this is arguably the most important function those journals
serve.”29 We find Crespi’s concerns surprising because he, too, chose

22. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 830.
23. The data are on file with the authors.
24. Incidentally, Crespi misunderstands one of our criticisms of the “expert opinion”
methodology he employs to rank international and environmental law reviews. See Crespi,
supra note 1, at 843 n.15. When we argued in our article that Crespi’s methodology has
limited applicability, see George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 826, we simply meant that it
would be impossible to find a panel of experts who could provide informed opinions on anything other than a discrete category of specialized reviews. Crespi could not have used his
methodology to undertake the (nearly) all-encompassing ranking we undertook in our article because he could not possibly have identified a panel of experts qualified to evaluate the
prestige of all specialized reviews.
25. See Crespi, supra note 1, at 845-48.
26. Id. at 840.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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to rank international and environmental reviews based on prestige30
and because he, too, neglected to factor instructional value into his
rankings.31
We do not believe that we need to provide a detailed justification
of our decision to rank journals based on prestige. Right or wrong,
good or bad, justified or unjustified, prestige speaks volumes in the
legal—and legal academic—world. The perceived prestige of law
schools, law professors, law firms, and law reviews has a profound
impact on many of the educational and professional decisions that
law students, lawyers, and law professors make.32 Accordingly, we
think our decision to attempt a prestige-based ranking of specialized
reviews will strike most readers as intuitive.33
3. The Jarvis-Coleman Author-Prominence Scale
Crespi’s most potent criticism of our methodology involves our decision to use the Jarvis-Coleman author-prominence scale to measure prestige. Crespi credits us with offering a “plausible” argument
“for using some form of author-prominence index as the ideal singlefactor criterion in measuring journal prestige,”34 but he argues that
we fail to provide an adequate justification for the use of the JarvisColeman scale.35
We acknowledge here, as we did in our original article, the problems associated with the Jarvis-Coleman methodology.36 We opted to
use the Jarvis-Coleman scale—rather than developing an authorprominence scale of our own—for purposes of comparison.37 Crespi
also criticizes us for failing to include generalist or primary law reviews and professional association journals in our rankings, noting
that the inclusion of these other journals “might have greatly en30. In his ranking of international and comparative law journals, for instance, Crespi
sent a survey to senior scholars in the field in which he asked respondents to rank the “10
top journals from the most prestigious (a ‘1’ ranking) to the least prestigious (a ‘10’ ranking).” Crespi, Ranking International Law, supra note 5, at 883 (emphasis added).
31. See id.
32. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, Part II.B.
33. In a recent article, Philip Postlewaite set out to assess whether tenured full professors in the tax field publish articles in “elite academic journals.” See Philip F. Postlewaite,
Life After Tenure: Where Have All the Articles Gone?, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 558, 558-59 (1998).
His measure of “elite academic journals” included the generalist law reviews published by
the top 16 law schools as well as two specialized tax journals, “the Tax Law Review (published by NYU) and the Tax Lawyer (published by the Tax Section of the American Bar Association).” Id. at 561. Postlewaite justified his inclusion of the specialized journals based in
part on the prestige of their contributing authors. See id. (“Given their long history and rich
tradition and the status of the contributing authors, these two journals seemed to me
roughly equivalent in prestige to the law reviews I had surveyed.”).
34. Crespi, supra note 1, at 844.
35. See id. at 844-45.
36. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 829, 836.
37. See id. at 826.
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hanced the utility of [the] rankings” we provided.38 By recommending that we compare our rankings of specialized reviews to rankings
of primary reviews and professional association journals, Crespi impliedly endorses our decision to use the Jarvis-Coleman methodology, rather than one of our own making, because we could only undertake such a comparison by using the same methodology.39
B. Results
Given his concerns about our methodology, we are not surprised
to find that Crespi is skeptical about the validity of the rankings our
methodology produced. Crespi compares our comprehensive ranking
of specialized reviews to his rankings of international and environmental journals and finds two issues of concern: (1) our rankings differ from his; and (2) international journals and environmental journals fare relatively poorly in our rankings.40
1. Differences Between the Rankings
Crespi notes first that our “author-prominence methodology generated ordinal rankings that, at least for the international/comparative
law and environmental law/natural resources law/land use planning
38. Crespi, supra note 1, at 842. (“[L]egal scholars interested in utilizing a ranking of
specialized law reviews probably want to see at least the better specialty journals compared
with flagship law journals. Authors often face the choice of publishing their work either in a
‘leading’ specialized journal or in a middle-of-the-pack flagship law journal, and they might
welcome some assistance in making this decision.”).
39. We limited our study to publications affiliated in some way with American law
schools, either supported by a law school alone or in conjunction with other academic departments, interest groups, or professional associations, because we were interested in the
development of legal periodicals in law schools. We did include professional association
journals with a formal relationship with a law school either on a permanent or rotating basis: American Journal of Law and Medicine, published by the American Society of Law &
Medicine, Inc., and Boston University School of Law; Bankruptcy Developments Journal,
published by Emory Law School in cooperation with the Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Institute; Computer Law Review and Technology Journal, published by Southern Methodist
University with the Computer Section of the State Bar of Texas; DePaul-LCA Journal of
Art & Entertainment Law, published by DePaul University College of Law and Lawyers for
the Creative Arts; Energy Law Journal, published by University of Tulsa Law School and
the Federal Energy Bar Association; The Environmental Lawyer, published by George
Washington University School of Law with the Section of Natural Resources, Energy, and
Environmental Law of the American Bar Association; International Lawyer, published by
the ABA Section on International Law and Practice with Southern Methodist University
Law School; Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal, published by the University of Texas
with the State Bar of Texas Intellectual Property Section; and Urban Lawyer, published by
the UMKC Law School with the American Bar Association Section of Local Government
Law.
Our decision to limit our study to law journals published by or with an American law
school was also pragmatic. American law schools publish 330 specialized journals. If we
added specialized journals not associated with American law schools, our study would have
encompassed more than 200 additional journals.
40. See Crespi, supra note 1, at 846-48.
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fields, differ dramatically from the rankings [Crespi] derived from
the opinions of academics in those fields.”41 With respect to international law journals, for instance, Crespi exclaims:
Surprisingly, of the many international law or comparative law
journals that fared well in my study, none fared particularly well
in the George & Guthrie study. The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, for example, which ranked fourth of eighty-eight specialty journals in that field in my study, was only ranked fiftysixth out of 285 journals by George & Guthrie, and the Stanford
Journal of International Law, which ranked twelfth in my study,
came in only ninety-ninth in their study. Most strikingly of all,
the Harvard International Law Journal, which ranked third in my
study, and the Yale Journal of International Law, which ranked
fifth in my study, did not even make George & Guthrie’s top 100
list! Yes, Harvard and Yale, while you fiercely compete with one
another for prominence, the word from George & Guthrie is that
your international law journals are not even players in their
fields!42

Similarly, with respect to his rankings of environmental law journals, Crespi notes that “[t]he top-ranked journal in my study, again
by a substantial margin, was the Ecology Law Quarterly, which was
ranked only sixty-second in the George & Guthrie study.”43
Crespi’s comparisons are misleading. Crespi ranked only international reviews (and environmental reviews), while we ranked specialized reviews of all types. It does not make any sense to compare
the ranking of a particular international journal (or environmental
journal) on his scale to the ranking of that journal on ours. Suppose
that Crespi ranked all the law schools in Ohio and determined that
Ohio State ranked first, while U.S. News ranked all American law
schools and determined that Ohio State ranked forty-second.44 Presumably, Crespi would attack the validity of the U.S. News ranking
based on the forty-one places separating Ohio State on the two
scales, even though he only ranked a subset of the law schools U.S.
News ranked. Obviously, the relevant comparison would be between
Ohio State’s ranking on his scale (#1) and its ranking among Ohio
law schools on the U.S. News scale (also #1). Similarly, the relevant
comparison here is how his ranking of international journals compared to our ranking of international journals and how his ranking
of environmental journals compared to our ranking of environmental
journals. We make these comparisons in Tables 1 and 2 below.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 847.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 847.
See 1998 U.S. News Rankings, supra note 16, at 78.
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TABLE 1.
COMPARISON OF GEORGE & GUTHRIE RANKING
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNALS WITH CRESPI RANKING
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNALS
JOURNAL NAME

OF
OF

ADJUSTED
G&G RANK
AMONG INT’L
JOURNALS45

ADJUSTED
CRESPI
RANK46

Virginia Journal of Int’l Law

1

4

George Washington Journal of Int’l Law and
Economics

2

19

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

3

N.R.47

Cornell Int’l Law Journal

4

11

Texas Int’l Law Journal

5

16

Law and Policy in Int’l Business

6

9

NYU Journal of Int’l Law and Politics

7

6

Columbia Journal of European Law

8

13

Syracuse Journal of Int’l Law and Commerce

9

N.R.

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

10

2

Michigan Journal of Int’l Law

11

5

Tulane Journal of Int’l and Comparative Law

12

18

Boston College Int’l Law Journal

13

N.R.

Brooklyn Journal of Int’l Law

14

N.R.

45. We exclude from our international law journal ranking one review—Criminal Law
Forum: An International Journal—because Crespi did not include it in his survey.
46. We exclude from Crespi’s ranking three international law reviews not included in
our study to create an adjusted ranking that is appropriate for comparison with ours. The
excluded journals are the American Journal of International Law, The American Journal of
Comparative Law, and the ICSID Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal. See Crespi,
Ranking International Law, supra note 5, at 874 tbl.I.
47. Crespi reported the international law journals that ranked in the top 25 according
to his expert survey results. See id. Hence, we can note whether the international journals
in the top 23 of our study were in the adjusted Crespi top 22. Journals with an “N.R.” fell
somewhere below 22 in the adjusted Crespi ranking.
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Fordham Int’l Law Journal

15

15

Hastings Int’l and Comparative Law Review

16

N.R.

American University Journal of Int’l Law and
Policy

17

21

Journal of Transnational Law and Policy

18

N.R.

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law and
Policy

19

8

Journal of Asian Law

20

N.R.

University of Miami Inter-American Law Review

21

N.R.

Tulane European and Civil Law Forum

22

18

Stanford Journal of Int’l Law

23

10

As reflected in Table 1, fifteen of the international law journals
ranked in the top twenty-three in our study also ranked in the top
twenty-two of Crespi’s study. This level of agreement is noteworthy
in light of the large number of international law journals—eightyeight—considered in both studies. Our study and Crespi’s study are
in accord as to two-thirds of the journals that rank in the top quarter
of international law journals.
The two studies also agree as to three journals that rank in the
top five of environmental law journals, as set forth below in Table 2.
Again, the high agreement rate is notable in light of the considerable
number of environmental law journals—thirty—considered by both
studies.
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TABLE 2.
COMPARISON OF GEORGE & GUTHRIE RANKING
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNALS WITH CRESPI RANKING
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNALS

OF
OF

G&G RANK
AMONG
ENVTL.
JOURNALS

ADJUSTED
CRESPI
RANK48

Columbia Journal of Environmental Law

1

4

Energy Law Journal

2

N.R.49

Ecology Law Quarterly

3

1

Stanford Environmental Law Journal

4

5

Villanova Environmental Law Journal

5

N.R.50

JOURNAL NAME

The expert survey methodology employed by Crespi, then, does not
produce results that differ drastically from the author-prominence
methodology employed by our study.

48. We excluded from Crespi’s ranking the one environmental law review—Environmental Law Reporter—not included in our study to create an adjusted ranking that is appropriate for comparison with ours. See Crespi, Ranking Environmental Law, supra note 5,
at 12 tbl.II.
49. Crespi reported all environmental journals placing in the top 20. See id. Nineteen
of those journals were included in our study. Journals not reflected in Crespi’s ranking are
marked “Not Ranked” (N.R.) and fell somewhere below 19 in the adjusted Crespi ranking.
Crespi does note, however, that the Energy Law Journal was “ranked among the top 10
journals by one or more respondents, but that [it] did not obtain a high enough average
ranking score to be listed in the top-20 ranking list.” Id. at 42 n.15.
50. Crespi reported that The Villanova Environmental Law Journal also was ranked
in the top 10 by one or more respondents. See id. at 42 n.15.
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2. The Performance of International and Environmental Reviews
Crespi also questions the relatively poor showing of international
and environmental journals in our ranking. Crespi notes:
[T]he international/comparative law journals and the environmental law/natural resources law/land use planning journals, as a
group, fared quite poorly in the George & Guthrie rankings. Not a
single one of the international/comparative law journals ranked
higher than twenty-fourth, and no environmental law/natural resources law/land use planning journal ranking higher than fiftysecond.51

Crespi expresses interest in comparing our rankings with others,
but he notes that “the only other efforts to rank the specialized reviews law reviews” that he is aware of are his own efforts to rank international and environmental reviews.52 While it is true that scholars have not focused their ranking efforts on specialized law reviews,53 scholars have ranked law reviews generally. We are aware of
two efforts in the 1990s to rank law reviews based on their citations
in other reviews—James Lindgren and Daniel Seltzer’s 1996 Chicago-Kent symposium piece54 and James Leonard’s 1990 St. Louis
University article55—and in both, a few specialized law reviews appear. Examining the specialized reviews that appear in these recent
rankings may shed some light on Crespi’s concern that international
and environmental reviews do not fare well in our rankings.
(a) Lindgren and Seltzer
Lindgren and Seltzer ranked law reviews based on citation
counts, using Shepard’s and the Social Science Citation Index
(SSCI).56 They provided three rankings, a top forty ranking based on
51. Crespi, supra note 1, at 847.
52. Id. at 846. In fact, William Landes and Richard Posner provided a modest citationcount ranking of law and economics journals and selected other interdisciplinary journals.
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study, 36 J.L. & ECON. 385, 416-24 (1993).
53. But see id. at 416-24.
54. James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties,
71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 781 (1996). Colleen Cullen and Randall Kalberg publish Lindgren &
Seltzer’s rankings in their article as well. See Colleen M. Cullen & S. Randall Kalberg, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1445, 1446, 145254 (1995).
55. James Leonard, Seein’ the Cites: A Guided Tour of Citation Patterns in Recent
American Law Review Articles, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 181 (1990). Janet Gumm also produced
a law review ranking in 1990, but she excluded non-primary reviews from her ranking. See
Janet M. Gumm, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 509, 515 (1990) (“We limited the scope of the survey to student-edited general interest
law journals published by American law schools.” (emphasis added)).
56. See Lindgren & Seltzer, supra note 54, at 781.
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Shepard’s only,57 a top forty ranking based on SSCI only, and a top
twenty ranking based on a combined Shepard’s/SSCI ranking.58
In the SSCI ranking, thirteen of the top forty journals were nonprimary journals, seven of which were also included in our ranking.59
We compare our results to Lindgren and Seltzer’s SSCI ranking in
Table 3.
TABLE 3. NON-PRIMARY JOURNALS IN LINDGREN & SELTZER SSCI TOP
4060 APPEARING IN GEORGE & GUTHRIE STUDY
JOURNAL NAME
Journal of Legal Studies
Journal of Law and Economics

G&G RANKING
4
below 100

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

14

American Criminal Law Review

12

Journal of Legal Education

15

Harvard Int’l Law Journal

below 100

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

50

Five of the seven SSCI top forty specialized journals are in our top
100, four in our top fifteen.61 International law and environmental
law journals fared relatively poorly in Lindgren and Seltzer’s study.
Only two international law reviews appeared in the SSCI top forty,
the American Journal of International Law, which ranks twentythird, and the Harvard International Law Journal, which ties for
thirty-ninth. No environmental law journals appeared in Lindgren
and Seltzer’s ranking.

57. In the Shepard’s ranking, only one non-primary law review appears, Business
Lawyer, which neither we nor Crespi ranked. See id. at 787 tbl.1. We excluded Business
Lawyer from our ranking because it is not affiliated with an American law school. See supra
note 39.
58. In the combined ranking, the only non-primary reviews to make the top 20 list are
the Journal of Legal Studies and the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, both
of which ranked in the top 15 of our study. See Lindgren & Seltzer, supra note 54, at 791
tbl.3.
59. The remaining six SSCI top 40 journals—Law and Society Review, American Journal of International Law, Business Lawyer, Law and Human Behavior, Law and Contemporary Problems, and Law and Social Inquiry—were not included in our ranking for various
reasons. See supra note 39; George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 829-30 n.91 & 836.
60. See id. at 789 tbl.2. The journals are listed in the rank order in which they appeared in the SSCI ranking.
61. In our original article, we noted our surprise at the poor showing of the Journal of
Law and Economics, but we explain its source. George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 836.
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(b) Leonard
Leonard also ranks law reviews based on citation frequency. In
his ranking of the top 100 reviews (actually top ninety-one and ties),
more than fifteen of the reviews that appeared are non-primary reviews.62 In Table 4, we consider how the non-primary journals in
Leonard’s top 100 placed in our top 100.63
TABLE 4. NON-PRIMARY JOURNALS IN LEONARD TOP 100 RANKING64
APPEARING IN GEORGE & GUTHRIE RANKING
JOURNAL NAME
Journal of Legal Studies
Journal of Law and Economics

G&G RANKING
4
below 100

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

14

Journal of Legal Education

15

Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly

64

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

50

Delaware Journal of Corporation Law

18

Harvard Women’s Law Journal

89

Supreme Court Review

1

Virginia Journal of Int’l Law

below 100

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

31

Yale Law and Policy Review

44

California Western Int’l Law Journal

below 100

Case Western Reserve Journal of Int’l Law

below 100

Journal of Family Law

below 100

Texas Int’l Law Journal

40

62. See Leonard, supra note 55, at 217-19 tbl.A.
63. Law and Contemporary Problems appeared in Leonard’s top 100, but it is not listed
in Table 4 because it was not ranked in our study.
64. See id.
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Eleven of the sixteen non-primary journals in Leonard’s top 100
ranking of all law journals also appear in our top 100 ranking of specialized journals (nine in the top half of our ranking). As in the Lindgren and Seltzer study, international law reviews and environmental
law journals fared poorly in Leonard’s index. Only four international
reviews appeared (all near the bottom of the ranking),65 and no environmental journals appeared.
Additionally, Leonard identified thirteen “high-impact” reviews
that “have a significant influence on legal scholarship,” three of
which are secondary journals: Journal of Legal Studies, Law and
Contemporary Problems, and Journal of Law and Economics.66
Journal of Legal Studies ranks fourth in our study. We did not rank
Law and Contemporary Problems because it publishes only in symposium format, though we acknowledge that it would likely appear
at the top of our ranking if included.67 Finally, as noted previously,68
the Journal of Law and Economics is among the most prestigious legal periodicals, but it does not fare well in our ranking because the
Jarvis-Coleman scale gives more weight to authors with legal academic appointments than to authors with non-legal appointments
(who account for most of the authors in JLE).69 None of the highimpact journals in Leonard’s study are in the international or environmental area.
In sum, a review of the only other studies ranking specialized law
journals (both as part of a ranking of law journals generally) discloses that international and environmental journals do not perform
well when compared to journals in other subject areas. Our authorprominence results are relatively consistent with the rankings produced in these citation-count studies.70
65. Virginia Journal of International Law ranks 63rd and California Western International Law Journal, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, and Texas International Law Journal tie for 91st. See id. at 218-19 tbl.A.
66. Id. at 194.
67. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 836.
68. See supra note 61.
69. See id. Consider Ronald Coase’s reflections on his famous JLE-published article,
The Problem of Social Cost:
That my article, The Problem of Social Cost, should appear at the head of the
list of the most-cited articles that have been published in legal periodicals is at
first sight quite extraordinary. It was an article written by an economist for
economists. It was no part of my intention to contribute to legal scholarship. It
was quite appropriate for my article to have appeared in the Journal of Law
and Economics (classified as a legal periodical by Mr. Fred Shapiro) since it was
my contention in that article that the legal system plays a major role determining the way in which the economic system functions.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost: The Citations, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809, 809
(1996).
70. Anecdotal evidence in support of our author-prominence approach is readily available. Consider, for example, Brian Leiter’s recent ranking of law schools. Brian Leiter, New
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II. REPLY TO KOROBKIN
Korobkin, who recently commented thoughtfully on law school
rankings in the Texas Law Review,71 provides an equally thoughtful
commentary on law journal rankings in this issue of the Florida
State University Law Review.72 Taking a law and economics perspective on the subject, Korobkin focuses on the ex ante effects of journal
rankings:73 “The important question to ask about the endeavor of
ranking law journals,” Korobkin contends, is “how rankings can be
devised to encourage the future production of valuable scholarship.”74 Because rankings based on author prominence, like ours, do
not promote the production of valuable scholarship, Korobkin concludes that they are indefensible.75 Below, we take issue with Korobkin’s premise (journal rankings can promote the production of valuable scholarship) and conclusion (our rankings are indefensible because they do not promote scholarship).
A. Korobkin’s “Valuable Scholarship” Premise
Rankings make for interesting conversation, Korobkin concedes,76
but to warrant publication in a law review, they should “serve an
important scholarly objective.”77 That objective, according to Korobkin, is “to create incentives for journal editors to select (and, therefore, for authors to create) more valuable scholarship than the academy would otherwise enjoy.”78 While we wholeheartedly support Korobkin’s endorsement of valuable scholarship,79 we question his claim
Educational Quality Ranking of U.S. Law Schools for 1998-99 (visited Apr. 5, 1999).
<http://www.dla.utexas.edu/depts/philosophy/faculty/leiter/LGOURMET. HTM>. Leiter ranks
law schools based on several criteria, including faculty publications in “the six leading student-edited [generalist] law reviews . . . and the leading faculty-edited journals in six major
fields of legal scholarship.” Id. We rank three of the six specialized reviews Leiter chose to
include in his ranking (Constitutional Commentary, Journal of Legal Studies, and Tax Law
Review), and each of the three placed in our top five. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at
831 tbl.4 & 835.
71. Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination
and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403 (1999).
72. Korobkin, supra note 2.
73. See Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 433, 436-7 (identifying “the ex ante perspective” as one of two key contributions that law and economics has made to the law).
74. Korobkin, supra note 2, at 852.
75. See id. at 863-64.
76. See, e.g., id. at 852 (noting that rankings “attract great interest” and “are fun”).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 874.
79. For some of our own recent efforts, see Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive
Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998); Tracey
E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74
WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999); Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion
Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
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that journal rankings—whether ours,80 Greg Crespi’s,81 or any others—can actually lead to the production of more valuable scholarship.82
Korobkin’s “valuable scholarship” argument goes something like
this: Law journal rankings can and should reflect the value of the
scholarship that each journal publishes.83 Once such rankings have
become established, law journal editors will rely on them “to solicit
and publish the types of articles that will help their journal achieve a
high ranking.”84 Law journal authors, in turn, will attempt to adjust
their scholarly endeavors to increase the likelihood that law journal
editors at leading publications will publish their articles.85
There are two significant problems with Korobkin’s argument.
The first problem is that, even if we assume for purposes of analysis
that his “broad and uncontroversial”86 definition of “valuable scholarship” is accurate, it is nearly (if not clearly) impossible to devise a
meaningful measure of it—to operationalize it—for purposes of
ranking specialized law reviews.
Korobkin contends that “valuable scholarship” can be operationalized in either of two ways. First, he argues that law journal users
or expert panels could assess the content of scholarship directly and
rank articles based on their scholarly value.87 If law journal users
and/or expert panels could, in fact, measure scholarly value directly
(and it is not clear that either group, particularly the former, can),
they could do so only for subsets of specialized reviews, as Korobkin
recognizes.88 International law experts might be able to assess the
scholarly value of articles appearing in international law journals,89
but neither international law experts nor a panel of varied experts
could possibly read and assess the scholarly value of articles appearing in all specialized reviews.

Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 77 (1997).
80. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 831 tbl.4.
81. See Crespi, Ranking Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 10 tbl.I; Crespi, Ranking
International Law, supra note 5, at 873 tbl.I.
82. Korobkin defines “valuable legal scholarship” as that which “contributes to a more
nuanced understanding of legal rules and institutions” and/or “adds new perspectives or insights to arguments about the normatively optimal set of legal rules and institutions.” Korobkin, supra note 2, at 860.
83. See id. at 852 (noting that rankings should be devised “to encourage the future
production of valuable scholarship”).
84. Id. at 856.
85. See id. at 859.
86. Id. at 860.
87. See generally id. Part III.C.2.
88. See id. at 873 (noting that “few, if any, potential evaluators are actually experts in
the broad range of subject areas” covered in all reviews).
89. See generally Crespi, Ranking International Law, supra note 5.
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Second, Korobkin argues that an article’s “citability” is “associated rather closely with scholarly value,” and thus, citation-based
rankings are likely to capture scholarly value in a meaningful way.90
The problem with this contention, as Korobkin recognizes, is that
while authors may cite to articles because of their scholarly value,
they may also cite to them for a number of other legitimate or illegitimate91 reasons that have nothing to do with the articles’ scholarly
value.92
Moreover, there is also a high correlation between citability and
author prominence. There is a strong relationship, for instance, between the Jarvis-Coleman author-prominence ranking of generalist
reviews and the most recent citation-based ranking of law reviews
conducted by Lindgren and Seltzer.93 Additionally, the authors of the
vast majority of articles appearing on Fred Shapiro’s lists of the
Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time94 and the Most-Cited
Law Review Articles of Recent Years95 were affiliated with “first-tier”
institutions at the time they published their articles, indicating that
these articles and the journals in which they appeared would have
ranked highly in either an author-prominence ranking or a citationbased ranking.96 This correlation between citability and author
prominence suggests that if citability is, in fact, a good proxy for
scholarly value, author prominence probably is as well.
The second problem with Korobkin’s “valuable scholarship” argument is that it rests on questionable assumptions about the behavior of law journal editors and authors. For Korobkin’s argument
to work, we must assume not only that it is possible to rank journals
in a way that accurately reflects scholarly value, but also that editors
and authors will behave as follows: (1) editors of the several hundred
generalist and specialized law reviews will stay abreast of these
rankings; (2) editors will discern from these rankings of alreadypublished journals how to select as-yet-unpublished articles that will
maximize rankings of journals in the future; (3) authors will discern
either from these rankings or from journal editors how to write articles that editors are likely to accept for publication; and (4) authors
90. Korobkin, supra note 2, at 865.
91. For an egregious example of illegitimate citing, see supra note 79.
92. To his credit, Korobkin identifies 10 such reasons in his response. See Korobkin,
supra note 2, at 865-66.
93. See George & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 829 n.88 (noting that “the Pearson correlation coefficient between Lindgren and Seltzer’s 1996 citation-based ranking of the top 40
law reviews and the Jarvis-Coleman author-prominence ranking is 0.745”).
94. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 751, 767-71 tbl.I (1996).
95. Id. at 773-77 tbl.II.
96. See id. at 764 (reporting the academic affiliations of the authors at the time they
published articles appearing on Shapiro’s most-recent “all-time” and “recent-articles” lists).
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will adjust their scholarly efforts to meet the demands of journal editors.97
The problems with these assumptions about editor/author behavior are manifest. First, it is not clear that all, or even a majority, of
editors would actually stay abreast of even established rankings.
How many student editors are currently aware, for instance, of
Lindgren and Seltzer’s recently published citation-based rankings,98
which Korobkin believes are a good proxy for scholarly value?
Second, even if many or all journal editors did stay abreast of the
rankings, it seems highly unlikely that the editors (particularly student editors) could discern from those journal rankings how to select
articles that would result in high journal rankings in the future. Are
editors currently looking, for instance, at the Lindgren-Seltzer citation-based rankings of journals and attempting to discern from those
rankings how to select articles that will help their journals ascend in
the rankings? And if so, how?
Third, it is not clear that all, or even a majority, of authors (particularly non-professor authors) will be able to discern from rankings
or from journal editors what kind of articles will place well. Are
practicing lawyers, judges, or even professors currently looking, for
instance, to the Lindgren-Seltzer citation-based ranking to discern
what sorts of articles are likely to place well? If so, how are they able
to discern from those rankings what kinds of articles will place well?
Fourth, it seems highly unlikely that many authors will adjust
their scholarly agendas to try to produce scholarship that they think
journal editors want. Are professors and others, for instance, currently modifying their scholarship for purposes of placing their articles in journals that rank highly in the Lindgren-Seltzer ranking?
Finally, apart from these obvious problems with Korobkin’s explicit assumptions about editor and author behavior, we are troubled
by the implicit assumption underlying his “valuable scholarship” argument. Ultimately, Korobkin’s argument rests on the assumption
that law journal authors are not producing scholarship that is as
valuable as it might be because there is not an agreed-upon ranking
reflecting scholarly value to guide their behavior. While we certainly
agree with Korobkin that authors are likely to respond to external as
well as internal rewards when deciding what and how to research
and write, we reject—perhaps naively—the notion that agreed-upon
97. Korobkin’s argument also rests on the explicit assumption that editors and authors
seek to maximize their respective places in journal rankings. See Korobkin, supra note 2, at
854-55 (arguing that “a journal’s ranking is likely to be very important to many (if not most)
journal editors”); id. at 856 (arguing that “[m]ost authors will prefer to have their articles
published in highly-ranked journals”).
98. See Lindgren & Seltzer, supra note 54.
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rankings would prompt authors to produce better scholarship than
they are currently producing.
B. Korobkin’s “Valuable Scholarship” Conclusion
Even assuming Korobkin’s premise that journal rankings can
promote the production of valuable scholarship is correct, Korobkin’s
conclusion that our rankings are indefensible because our rankings
will not promote such scholarship is mistaken for at least two reasons.
1. Author-Prominence Incentive Effect
The first problem with Korobkin’s conclusion that our rankings
are indefensible is that our rankings do, in fact, provide journal
authors with an incentive to publish valuable scholarship. Assume,
as Korobkin does, that journal editors will use established journal
rankings to inform their article selection decisions.99 Journal editors
consulting our rankings can maximize their journal ranking by publishing articles written by authors with relatively higher prestige
scores. Because most articles are written by law professors and lawyers100 and because law professors have higher prestige scores than
almost all lawyers,101 journal editors have an incentive to favor publication of articles written by law professors over those written by
lawyers.
The fact that our rankings create an incentive for journal editors
to publish scholarship produced by law professors may very well result in the publication of more valuable scholarship. Law professors,
after all, engage in scholarship as part of their occupation. Moreover,
law professors arguably are imbued with objectivity unavailable to
the lawyer advocating on behalf of clients and are likely to have
more time, resources, and skill to produce scholarship. While it
would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to “prove” that law professor-produced scholarship is more valuable, it is interesting to note
that only two of the 100 Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All

99. See Korobkin, supra note 2, at 854-55.
100. See id. at 861.
101. According to the Jarvis-Coleman author-prominence scale, law professors employed by first-tier schools have a prestige score of 525, second-tier law professors 475,
third-tier law professors 400, fourth-tier law professors 275, and fifth-tier law professors
225. See Jarvis & Coleman, supra note 8, at 16. With the exception of partners of the National Law Journal’s top 250 firms, “lawyers” have a prestige score of 175. See id. Thus, a
specialized journal publishing articles written entirely by practicing lawyers would obtain
an average score of 175, which would not place the journal in our top 100 ranking. A specialized journal publishing articles written entirely by third-tier law professors, by contrast,
would obtain a score of 400, placing that journal in our top five!
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Time102 and not one of the Most-Cited Law Review Articles of Recent
Years103 were written by “lawyers;” virtually all were written by law
professors.
2. Other Reasons to Rank
The second problem with Korobkin’s conclusion that our ranking
is indefensible is that we did not, as Korobkin recognizes, set out to
rank specialized reviews for purposes of promoting the future publication of valuable scholarship.104 That he identifies it as the purpose
of ranking journals does not make it so. Legitimate rationales for
ranking journals abound.105
We set out to provide our ranking of specialized reviews for three
reasons. First, given the dearth of published information about the
specialized law review phenomenon, we sought to provide some basic
information about the emergence and explosion of specialized reviews. Second, given limited time and a large number of specialized
reviews, we hoped to help readers to make reading decisions and
writers to make placement decisions. We did not—and do not—mean
to suggest that readers and writers should base their decisions solely
on our, or on any other, ranking. But we do suspect that, all other
things being equal, readers would prefer to keep abreast of articles
written by prestigious authors (or authors affiliated with prestigious
institutions), and writers would prefer to place their articles in journals publishing prestigious authors (or authors affiliated with prestigious institutions). Third, and finally, we hoped to spark dialogue
and debate about the phenomenon and ranking of specialized journals.
III. CONCLUSION
It appears that our ranking of specialized law reviews—like
rankings of law schools, generalist law reviews, and other aspects of
the legal academic world—does, in fact, rankle.106 We end, as we began, by thanking Crespi and Korobkin for rankling at our ranking.

102. Shapiro, supra note 94, at 767-71 tbl.I. Law partners Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis published the ninth-ranked The Right of Privacy in 1890. See id. at 767. ACLU
staff attorney Bruce Ennis co-authored the 35th-ranked article with a psychology professor
in 1974. See id. at 768.
103. Id. at 773-77 tbl.II.
104. See infra Part II.B.
105. See, e.g., Crespi, supra note 1, at 839 (identifying a variety of reasons to rank specialized law journals).
106. See Terry Carter, Rankled by the Rankings, ABA J., Mar. 1998, at 46.

